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1 Introduction
Hobbesian anarchy is a societal state prior to the formation of a government that ensures
property rights. Without a governmental organization, no individuals are safe to secure their
wealth. Individuals could be tempted to pillage others whenever possible and benecial.
Although a coalition could be formed to secure their wealth, some members of the coalition
may still be tempted to betray others and to take their wealth. Consequently, in Hobbesian
anarchy, the possibility of the stable distribution of wealth is questionable.
A substantial amount of literature on allocation by force has been devoted to this pos-
sibility. Skaperdas (1992) showed that a cooperative outcome is possible in equilibrium if
the probability of winning in conict is su¢ ciently robust against each individuals action.
Hirshleifer (1995) found the conditions under which Hobbesian anarchy is stable. Also, Hir-
shleifer (1991), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), and Muthoo (1991) studied the situations in
which property right is partially secured. These studies analyzed noncooperative models in
which the formation of coalitions is limited or not allowed.
In contrast to the previous models, Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) and Jordan (2006)
developed models of Hobbesian anarchy that allow the formation of coalitions. Piccione
and Rubinstein introduced the jungle in which coercion governs economic transactions and
they compared the equilibrium allocation of the jungle with the equilibrium allocation of an
exchange economy. Jordan introduced pillage games and examined stable sets of allocations
in which the power of pillaging balances endogenously.
The spatial pillage game is an extended version of a pillage game. In most literature on
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allocation by forceincluding the studies above, there is no restrictions on the use of power.
Thus, any individual or coalitions can pillage another individual or other coalitions if one
is more powerful than others. However, the acts of pillaging and defending are inevitably
conditioned under spatial restriction. Members of a coalition, if they move together, can-
not simultaneously pillage two less powerful coalitions that are far apart from each other.
Likewise, two coalitions cannot combine their power to defend themselves together against
another powerful coalition unless they are close enough to each other. The spatial pillage
game introduces a space feature, which conditions power usage based on location, into a
Hobbesian anarchy model that allows the formation of coalitions, in the hope of understand-
ing how spatial restriction a¤ects stable distributions of wealth.
The spatial pillage game internalizes the space feature through the following assumptions.
There are regions and each player can stay in only one of the regions. Players can change
their regions to pillage others. The regions are connected with one another, and thus players
can travel from a region to another in one move. Players can form a coalition and combine
their power only after getting together in a common region. If coalitions are in di¤erent
regions, they cannot combine their power. The inuence of the power of each coalition
is limited within its region. Therefore, a coalition cannot pillage two other coalitions in
di¤erent regions simultaneously.
The other assumptions in this spatial pillage game are the same as in the original pillage
games. A xed amount of wealth is allocated among a nite number of players. Some
players can form a coalition under the spatial restriction. A coalition can pillage less powerful
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coalitions within its region without any cost. An increase in the wealth of a coalition causes
an increase in its power. Since the power of each coalition is endogenously determined, the
spatial pillage game cannot have a characteristic function, which exogenously determines the
power of each coalition.
The pillage games are characterized by power functions that determine the feasibility of
pillages between coalitions. Jordan (2006) presented three power functions classied by the
degree of their dependence on the sizes of coalitions. Wealth is power is one of the power
functions and species the power of each coalition as its total wealth. Therefore, wealth is
poweris characterized as independent of the sizes of coalitions. Only the pillage game with
this power function has a stable set in every possible case. Therefore, the spatial pillage
game adopts wealth is poweras a power function so that if there exist solutions in this
spatial pillage game, then we can compare it with the solutions in the original pillage game
and can nd out how the spatial restriction a¤ects a stable distribution of wealth.
As criteria for stable distributions of wealth and players, three solution concepts are
explored; core, stable set, and farsighted core. First, the core is the collection of states at
which pillage is not possible, thus it is one of the most persuasive solution concepts. However,
due to its strong requirement, the core is too small to represent stable states as shown in
Theorem 1. Second, the stable set is much bigger than the core if it exists, as shown in
Proposition 1 and Example 1. A stable set is a collection of states that is both internally
stable and externally stable. Internal stability requires that pillage not be possible between
states in the collection and external stability requires that pillage at a state outside the
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collection result in another state inside the collection. In some cases, however, no stable set
exists and even when they do exist, they contain implausible states. Third, the farsighted
core, which was introduced by Jordan (2006), solves these problems with stable sets, as
shown in Theorem 2. A farsighted core admits the assumption that a player has forecasting
ability and is dened as a collection of states at which pillage in expectation is not possible in
the sense that some members of the pillage would end up being worse o¤, and consequently
they would not join the pillage.
In section 2, we search for the core and stable sets. The core is not a¤ected by the
spatial restriction since allocations in the core does not change under the spatial restriction.
A stable set, on the other hand, is a¤ected by the spatial restriction. Thus, the stable set,
if it exists, is much bigger than a stable set in Jordans model. In section 3, we study the
farsighted core. There exists the unique farsighted core and it is similar to the farsighted core
in Jordans model. Since Jordans model, without the spatial concept, induces similar result
to the one in this spatial pillage game, we conclude that if the players have the forecasting
ability, the assumption that the farsighted core bases on, then the stable distributions of
wealth do not change with or without the spatial restriction.
2 Core and stable set
The environment of the spatial pillage game is dened in Denitions 1 and 2. We normalize
the total wealth to unity.
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Denition 1 1 The nite set I is the set of players. A coalition is a subset of I. The set
A = fw 2 R#I : wi  0 for all i 2 I and
P
z2I wz = 1g is the set of allocations.
The denitions below concern the spatial environment.
Denition 2 The nite set R is the set of regions and the Cartesian product R#I is the
set of distributions. Given a distribution p 2 R#I , the coalition pr = fi 2 I : pi = rg is
the population at region r.
A distribution is short for a population distribution and denotes how players are distrib-
uted over the regions. For example, the distribution p = (1; 1; 2) expresses that players 1
and 2 are at region 1 and player 3 is at region 2. Also, it means p1 = f1; 2g and p2 = f3g.
A state denotes both the allocation and distribution of the status quo.
Denition 3 The Cartesian product X = AR#I is the set of states.
For instance, the ordered pair (w; p) = ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 2)) is a state in a three-player and
two-region model. The state (w; p) expresses that player 1 has 1
2
and player 2 has 1
4
while
staying at region 1 and player 3 has 1
4
while staying at region 2.
The dominance relation between states is dened as follows;
Denition 4 Given states (w; p) and (w0; p0), dene W = fi : w0i > wig and L = fi : w0i <
wig. Suppose that for some r 2 R, i) fi : w0i 6= wig  pr; ii) for all q 6= r; p0q = pq nW ; and
iii)
P
i2W wi >
P
i2Lwi. Then, the state (w
0; p0) dominates the state (w; p).
1 We follow notations in Jordan (2006).
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The dominance relation shows the states to which the status quo can move. It must
satisfy both physical and spatial conditions. The physical condition requires that the winning
coalition W have enough power to pillage the losing coalition L. Denition 4 presents this
condition at iii). Jordan (2006) introduced a variety of physical conditions. The condition
iii) above accords with the physical condition of the wealth is power in Jordan (2006). The
spatial condition requires that the acts of pillaging satisfy spatial restriction. This condition
is expressed at i) and ii) in the denition above. The condition i) means that transfers of
wealth happen only in the destination region r where the pillage happens. The condition ii)
denotes that only the winners travel. That is, the spatial restriction in dominance relation is
that W can gather into a common region and can combine their power in order to pillage L.
Note that if there is only one region, then this denition of dominance relation coincides with
the denition of the wealth is power in Jordan (2006). So, this denition can be considered
as a spatial version of the wealth is power.
In this section, we adopt the solution concepts of core and stable set. The denition
stated below follows Lucas (1992) and Jordan (2006).
Denition 5 The set of undominated states is the core C. For any set E of states, let the
set U(E) be the set of states that are not dominated by any state in E. A set S of states is
a stable set if it satises both S  U(S), which means internal stability, and S  U(S),
which means external stability.
Theorem 1 embodies the core.
Theorem 1 The set C = f(w; p) 2 X : for each i 2 I, wi = 1; 12 ; or 0g is the core.
6
Proof. Suppose (w; p) 2 C. For any i 2 I, if wi > 0 then wi  12 and
P
j 6=iwj  12 .
Therefore, any player can prevent others from pillaging itself. This means that (w; p) is
not dominated. Since (w; p) is arbitrary, every state in C is not dominated. Suppose
(w; p) =2 C. Then, there exists i such that wi 2 (0; 12) [ (12 ; 1). If wi 2 (0; 12), then the
coalition W = fj : j 6= ig can pillage player i since Pj 6=iwj > 12 > wi. If wi 2 (12 ; 1), then
wi >
1
2
>
P
j 6=iwj and thus player i can pillage others. This means that (w; p) is dominated
by some state in X. Since (w; p) is arbitrary, every state in X n C is dominated.
Theorem 1 shows the core does not change under the spatial restriction since allocations
in C does not change under the spatial restriction. This result is natural in that the core is
the set of states that are not dominated by another state. Without the spatial restriction,
if a state is not dominated by another state, then it must be undominated under the spatial
restriction. Also, if a state is dominated by some state without the spatial restriction, then
it can be dominated under the spatial restriction by pillaging only one player in the losing
coalition. So, it cannot be in the core under the spatial restriction. Therefore, core allocations
do not change under the spatial restriction.
Stable set is more involved than the core. First, we start with the trivial case in which
there is only one region. Denition 6 introduces a dyadic state and the set of dyadic states
D. Proposition 1 establishes that the set D is the unique stable set in an one-region model.
Note that Denition 6 and Proposition 1 are adapted from Jordan (2006) for the spatial
pillage game.
Denition 6 An allocation w 2 A is dyadic if for each i, wi = 0 or (12)ki for some non-
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negative integer ki. A state (w; p) is dyadic if w is dyadic. The set D denotes the set of
dyadic states.
Proposition 1 (Theorem 3.3 in Jordan, 2006) In an one-region model, the unique sta-
ble set is D.
Next, under the spatial restriction, an example is shown to illustrate some features about
the stable set.
Example 1 (Existence of a stable set in three-player models) Dene the set of states
S 0  f(w; p) 2 X : for distinct players i; j; k 2 I, i) wi  12 , ii) wj = wk = 1 wi2 , and iii)
pj 6= pkg. Then, the set of states D [ S 0 is a stable set in three-player models1.
Proposition 2 states nonexistence of the stable set in the four-player and two-region
model.
Proposition 2 No stable set exists in the four-player and two-region model.
Proof. A proof is omitted but is available from the author.
These results on the stable sets show that the stable sets are a¤ected by the spatial
restriction. Without the spatial restriction, the stable set is the set of dyadic states D.
However, under the spatial restriction, the stable sets change so that it includes more states
than D because of the limited feasibility of the dominance relation. Moreover, in four-player
and two-region model, a stable set does not exist.
1 Complete characterization of stable sets in three-player models is available from the author.
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As shown in Example 1 and Proposition 2, the stable set with respect to the dominance
relation is not regarded as a plausible solution to the spatial pillage game. In the four-player
and two-region model, no stable set exists. In the three-player models, there exist stable
sets. However, they contain implausible states, such as some states in the set of states
X#I = f(w; p) : for some player i, 1 > wi > 12g. According to the interpretation about a
stable set in Harsanyi (1974), no state in X#I can be a plausible prediction because one of
the players has enough power to pillage the others, so eventually the player will pillage the
rest of the wealth. That is, any state in X#I is directly or indirectly dominated by the core
and thus cannot be a stable state.
These problems with the stable set with respect to the dominance relation are caused
by the limited feasibility of dominance relation under the spatial restriction. This limited
feasibility of dominance relation, in turn, makes the conditions of the stable set, both internal
stability and external stability, improper to be requirements for a proper solution to the
spatial pillage game. The external stability requires that any state outside a stable set be
directly dominated by some state in the stable set. With respect to this limited dominance
relation, some states in X#I are directly dominated only by other states in X#I , thus a
stable set must contain some states in X#I to satisfy external stability. Also, with respect
to this limited dominance relation, the core cannot directly dominate every state in X#I ,
and thus an internally stable set can include both the core and some states in X#I . This
explains why stable sets in three-player models contain some states in X#I .
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In the four-player and two-region model, if an internally stable set S 00 includes a set, of
states, that dominates every state in X#I n S 00, then due to the limited feasibility of the
dominance relation, S 00 contains improperly many states so that there exists some state
(w; p) =2 S 00 such that S 00 inevitably dominates every state that dominates (w; p). Thus, by
the internal stability of S 00, S 00 cannot dominate (w; p), which is not in S 00. That is, there
is no set of states that satises both internal stability and external stability. This explains
why no stable set exists in these models.
Jordan (2006) introduced a new solution concept, farsighted core. This farsighted core
is dened based on an advanced concept of dominance relation, Dominance in Expecta-
tion. In this dominance in expectation, players make an expectation about how each state
proceeds, and they pillage or defend according to their expectation. Naturally, this advanced
concept of dominance relation allows broader feasibility of dominance relation while satis-
fying the spatial restriction. As a result, this solution concept based on the dominance in
expectation solves the problems with the stable set and provides the unique solution which
represents an endogenous balance of power,as Jordan (2006) mentioned.
3 Core in expectation
The farsighted core solution concept is dened as follows. An expectation is a belief that all
players have in common and indicates how each state proceeds.
Denition 7 An expectation is a function f : X  ! X satisfying, for some integer
k  2, fk = fk 1 where fk = f  fk 1. Let fw(w; p) and fp(w; p) denote the allocation and
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the distribution at f(w; p), respectively.
Jordan (2006) considered only one-step expectation where every state reaches its stable
state within one step, i.e. f = f 2. Here, the expectation is extended as a nite-step expecta-
tion where some states take nite steps, possibly more than one step, to reach their stable
states. Based on this extended expectation, this study shows the same result, Corollary 1,
as the result in Jordan (2006).
Dominance in Expectation between states indicates possible states into which the present
state can change, provided that players follow the expectation after the changes. Just like
in the previous dominance relation, both physical and spatial conditions should be satised
in order for a winning coalition in expectation, who end up being better o¤, to change its
present state through defeating a losing coalition in expectation, who end up being worse
o¤. Physical condition is reected on the conditions iii) and iv) in Denition 8 and spatial
condition is reected on the conditions i) and ii).
Denition 8 Let an expectation f satisfy fk = fk+1. Given states ( w; p) and (w(n); p(n)),
for each n 2 N, dene W (n)f = fi : fkw( w; p)i > w(n)ig and L(n)f = fi : fkw( w; p)i < w(n)ig.
Then, a state ( w; p) dominates (w; p) in expectation if there exists a sequence of states
f(w(n); p(n))gNn=1 that has (w(1); p(1)) = (w; p) and (w(N); p(N)) = ( w; p) such that for each
1  n  N   1 and for some r 2 R, i) fi : w(n+1)i 6= w(n)ig  p(n+1)r; ii) for all q 6= r,
p(n + 1)q = p(n)q n (W (n)f \ p(n + 1)r); iii)
P
i2W (n)f \p(n+1)r
w(n)i >
P
i2L(n)f \p(n+1)r
w(n)i;
and iv)
P
i2W (n)f
w(n)i >
P
i2L(n)f
w(n)i.
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This dominance relation concept considers players ability to forecast how each state
proceeds. When the players have forecasting ability, they maximize their allocations in a
nal state. Thus, if some players expect that they belong to a losing coalition in expectation,
L
(n)
f , who will be pillaged and so will be worse o¤ in the nal state, then they might have an
incentive to get together in a common region and combine their powers in order to defend
themselves against a winning coalition in expectation, W (n)f , who will be better o¤ in the
nal state. However, under the condition iv), L(n)f basically has no power to deter W
(n)
f
from pillaging L(n)f even when all members of L
(n)
f gather and combine their powers. This is
becauseW (n)f can also gather and combine their powers to pillage L
(n)
f . As a result, under the
condition iv), L(n)f has no incentive to take any defensive action and therefore, this condition
is necessary thatW (n)f successfully pillages L
(n)
f when the players have the forecasting ability.
The condition iv), however, is not su¢ cient that W (n)f practically executes its plan to
pillage L(n)f . This is because W
(n)
f can exert its power only under the spatial restriction.
Together with the condition iv), the conditions i), ii), and iii) represent su¢ cient conditions
that W (n)f executes its plan to pillage L
(n)
f under the spatial restriction. These conditions
are similar to the conditions in Denition 4. So, the condition i) means that in each step of
the pillaging process, transfers of wealth happen only in one region r where pillage actually
happens. The condition ii) states that only members of W (n)f travel. Finally, the condition
iii) denotes that members of W (n)f in the region r have enough power to pillage members of
L
(n)
f in r. So, this pillage by the members of W
(n)
f is feasible within r.
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This denition di¤ers from the denition of dominance in expectation in Jordan (2006)
in that this denition generalizes the number of steps that the dominance relation can
take. Jordan (2006) introduced one-step dominance in expectation in which every plan to
change a state can be completed within one step, i.e. (w(1); p(1)) = (w; p) and (w(2); p(2))
= ( w; p). This Jordans denition is suitable for the one-step expectation since it can be
organized according to a binary relation derived from the one-step dominance in expectation.
However, the nite-step expectations, except one-step expectations, cannot be organized
according to the binary relation. Since the present study extends the expectation as the
nite-step expectation, the dominance in expectation must also be generalized as the nite-
step dominance in expectation in which plans to change a state can take more than one steps
before it ends, i.e. (w(N); p(N)) = ( w; p) for some N  2. If an expectation is organized
in accord with a relation derived from the dominance in expectation, it is called a consistent
expectation. Jordan (2006) interpreted consistency as a rational expectation property.He
said that an expectation is consistent if only rational acts of pillage are expected, and an
allocation is expected to persist only if no rational pillage is possible.
Denition 9 An expectation f is consistent if f(w; p) dominates (w; p) in expectation
whenever f(w; p) 6= (w; p) and if (w; p) is undominated in expectation whenever f(w; p) =
(w; p).
Farsighted core and farsighted supercore2 are dened as follows.
2 Farsighted supercore is named after Roths (1976) supercore.
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Denition 10 Given a consistent expectation f , the farsighted core under the expectation
f is the set of states Kf = f(w; p) 2 X : under the expectation f , no state in X dominates
(w; p) in expectationg. The farsighted supercore CS is the intersection of all farsighted
cores.
A farsighted core is a set of stable states under some consistent expectation. The far-
sighted supercore is the set of stable states for all consistent expectations. Theorem 2 states
that for any consistent expectation, the set of dyadic states D is the unique farsighted core
and therefore is the farsighted supercore.
Theorem 2 A consistent expectation f exists and the farsighted core Kf under f is the set
of dyadic states, D. Therefore, the farsighted supercore CS is also D.
The proof of Theorem 2 uses the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 For any state (w; p), if an allocation w0 satises
P
i2fi:w0i>wigwi >
P
i2fi:w0i<wigwi
and f(w0; p) = (w0; p) for every distribution p, then there exists a distribution p0 such that
(w0; p0) dominates (w; p) in expectation.
Proof. Suppose that a state (w; p) and an allocation w0 satisfy the premise of this lemma.
To prove this lemma, it su¢ ces to construct a sequence of states f(w(n); p(n))gNn=1 that can
make (w0; p0) dominate (w; p) in expectation for some p0.
LetW 0f = fi : w0i > wig and L0f = fi : w0i < wig. Select (w(2); p(2)) such that (w(2); p(2))
results from W 0fs pillaging all members of L
0
f in the region minfpi : i 2 L0fg and also from
W 0fs proportioning their wealth to w
0. Similarly, select states (w(n); p(n)) for n 2 N until
w(N) = w0 for some N . Then, the sequence of the states f(w(n); p(n))gNn=1 makes (w0; p0)
dominate (w; p) in expectation for some p0.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 3.10 in Jordan, 2006) For some positive integer k, let w be a dyadic
allocation such that for each i, if wi > 0 then wi  2 (k+1). If an allocation w0 satises
that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz >
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz, then there exists a dyadic allocation w
00 such thatP
z2fi:w00i >w0igw
0
z >
P
z2fi:w00i <w0igw
0
z and for each i, if w
00
i > 0 then w
00
i  2k.
14
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we are going to construct a consistent expectation that has
a farsighted core D and then will prove the uniqueness of the farsighted core.
Construct an expectation f as follows. If (w; p) 2 D, then f(w; p) = (w; p). If (w; p) =2 D,
then select a dyadic allocation w0 such that
P
i2fi:w0i>wigwi >
P
i2fi:w0i<wigwi. Proposition
1 assures the existence of w0. Let W 0f = fi : w0i > wig and L0f = fi : w0i < wig. Construct
f(w; p) such that f(w; p) results fromW 0fs pillaging all members of L
0
f in the region minfpi :
i 2 L0fg and also from W 0fs proportioning their wealth to w0. Similarly, construct fn(w; p)
for n 2 N until fNw (w; p) = w0 for some N .
Now, we need to show the expectation f constructed above is consistent. If (w; p) =2 D,
then for each n  N   1, we have that P
i2W (n)f
fnw(w; p)i >
P
i2L(n)f
fnw(w; p)i where W
(n)
f =
fi : w0i > fnw(w; p)ig and L(n)f = fi : w0i < fnw(w; p)ig. That is, the fourth condition in
Denition 8 is satised. Also, it is easily seen that the expectation f is designed to satisfy
the other three conditions in Denition 8. Consequently, for each n  N , a state fn(w; p)
dominates fn 1(w; p) in expectation where f 0(w; p) = (w; p). In addition, no state (w; p)
in D is dominated in expectation by another state (w0; p0) in D because
P
i2fi:w0i>wigwi
 Pi2fi:w0i<wigwi by Proposition 1. That is, if (w; p) 2 D and thus f(w; p) = (w; p), then
(w; p) is not dominated in expectation. Therefore, the expectation f is consistent.
To prove the uniqueness of a farsighted core, let f be a consistent expectation with the
farsighted core Kf . Also, for each non-negative integer n, dene Dn = f(w; p) 2 D : wi = 0
or  (1
2
)ng. Then, we have D0  Kf . Suppose, by way of induction, that for some n, we
have Dn  Kf . Note that if (w; p) 2 Dn, then (w; p0) 2 Dn for any distribution p0. Thus, by
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Lemmas 1 and 2, any state (w0; p0) that dominates some state (w; p) 2 Dn+1 in expectation
is dominated in expectation by some state (w00; p00) in Dn because the allocation w0 satises
that
P
i2fi:w0i>wigwi >
P
i2fi:w0i<wigwi. Since f is consistent, we have that Dn+1  Kf . By
induction, we have D  Kf . In addition, D dominates all states outside D by Proposition
1 and by Lemma 1. Again, since f is consistent, if (w; p) =2 D, then (w; p) =2 Kf , that is,
Kf  D. Therefore, we have Kf = D, and since f is an arbitrary consistent expectation,
we have CS = D.
This result is similar to the result in Jordan (2006), which stated thatD is the unique far-
sighted core in one region models, which, in turn, do not have the spatial restriction. Clearly,
dominance relation with respect to dominance in expectation changes if we introduce the
spatial restriction. For example, lets consider the dominance relation between the following
two states; ( w; p) = ((1; 0); (1; 1)) and (w; p) = ((3
4
; 1
4
); (2; 2)). Then, ( w; p) and (w; p) satisfy
the physical condition for the dominance relation because
P
i2fi: wi>wigwi >
P
i2fi: wi<wigwi.
So, if there is no spatial restriction, then ( w; p) dominates (w; p) in expectation. But, if we
introduce the spatial restriction, then ( w; p) does not dominate (w; p) in expectation because
any possible pillaging movement from (w; p) will results in the distribution (2; 2). That is,
in this example, dominance relation with respect to dominance in expectation has changed
under the spatial restriction.
Nevertheless, Theorem 2 shows that if the players have the forecasting ability, then only
states in D are expected to persist even when there is the spatial restriction. This is because
the forecasting ability enhances playersability to pillage. As a result, the forecasting ability
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complements the limited feasibility of pillages under the spatial restriction so that this limited
feasibility does not a¤ect the set of stable states that represents an endogenous balance of
power. Therefore, under the farsighted-player assumption, the set of stable states
does not change under the spatial restriction.
Theorem 2 also shows that the dominance in expectation selectively reects the concept
of indirect dominancewhich was introduced by Harsanyi (1974) and formalized by Chwe
(1994). The indirect dominance concept means that if (w; p) dominates (w0; p0) with respect
to, for example, the dominance relation in Denition 4 and (w0; p0) dominates (w00; p00), then if
(w; p) is a stable, (w00; p00) cannot be a stable state since (w; p) indirectly dominates (w00; p00).
To see how the dominance in expectation selectively reects this indirect dominance concept,
let (w; p) only indirectly dominate (w00; p00), that is, (w; p) cannot dominate (w00; p00) at once,
and there exists a state that is dominated by (w; p) and dominates (w00; p00) simultaneously.
If there exists a route that connects from (w00; p00) to (w; p) and through which a winning
coalition who prefers (w; p) to (w00; p00) can achieve (w; p) by pillaging a losing coalition who
prefers (w00; p00) to (w; p), then (w; p) dominate (w00; p00) in expectation. Otherwise, (w; p) does
not dominate (w00; p00) in expectation. Here, the route is a sequence of states in Denition
8 that satises four conditions above, and the four conditions are su¢ cient conditions to
change a state when the players have the forecasting ability. Therefore, the dominance
in expectation reects the indirect dominance concept only if a dominance relation can be
actualized by the players who have the forecasting ability. As a result, this dominance in
expectation designates the set of dyadic states D as the unique set of stable states.
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In addition, the set D can be considered as a self-enforcing standard of behavior,as
interpreted by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947). This is because no state inside D is
dominated in expectation by another state in D whereas every state outside D is dominated
in expectation by some state in D. Therefore, we conclude that the concept of dominance
in expectation in this spatial pillage game captures the combined concept from Harsanyis
indirect dominance and von Neumann and Morgensterns self-enforcing standard of behavior
according to the spatial restriction.
We conclude that the concept of dominance in expectation in this spatial pillage game
captures the combined concept from Harsanyis indirect dominance and von Neumann and
Morgensterns self-enforcing standard of behavior according to the spatial restriction.
Xue (1998) and Konishi and Ray (2003) also introduced solution concepts for a coalitional
game. Their solution concepts, similar to the farsighted core, are dened based on a progress
of states that shows how the status quo proceeds to a stable state under the farsighted-player
assumption. However, in contrast to the farsighted core, their solution concepts focus mainly
on the forecasting ability of a winning coalition, and thus their solution concepts might not
capture the fact that a losing coalition also has the forecasting ability and so they can de-
fend themselves according to their expectation. As a result, their solution concepts might
not designate some states that would be regarded as stable states if all players forecast-
ing abilities are considered. For example, in their solution concepts, the progress of states
((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1))  ! ((3
4
; 0; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1))  ! ((1; 0; 0); (1; 1; 1)) is possible. Thus, the state
((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)) might not be a stable state according to their solution concepts. However,
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since a losing coalition has the forecasting ability, at the state ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)), player 3
will help player 2 in order to deter player 1 from pillaging player 2 in expectation that the
second state ((3
4
; 0; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)) will proceed to the third state ((1; 0; 0); (1; 1; 1)). Accord-
ingly, the state ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 1)) shows balanced power among the players and therefore
must be regarded as a stable state under the farsighted-player assumption as it is under the
farsighted core solution concept.
Finally, Corollary 1 states that denitions about the farsighted core in Jordan (2006) can
be extended to the denitions in this study.
Corollary 1 In one region models, a consistent expectation exists, and it has Kf = D.
Therefore, CS is also D.
Jordan (2006) used the one-step expectation and the one-step dominance in expectation
and showed the same result as Corollary 1. Therefore, the denitions in Jordan (2006) can
be extended as the nite-step expectation and the nite-step dominance in expectation.
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